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     ABSTRACT 
 
The Financial Crisis has not only highlighted the importance of addressing issues such as 
liquidity risk – it has also brought to the fore the need to focus on unregulated instruments 
such as hedge funds, which are of systemic importance to the financial industry. Risk is an 
area which, owing to its increasing significance, requires greater focus. A move to risk based 
strategies is evidenced by the growing popularity of risk based regulation and meta 
regulatory strategies. Given the presence of an unregulated hedge fund industry however, 
such attempts do not suffice on their own. Further, the systemic nature of risk exacerbates the 
problem of such unregulated institutions.  
 
 
This paper aims to address complexities and challenges faced by regulators in identifying and 
assessing risk, problems arising from different perceptions of risk, and solutions aimed at 
countering problems of risk regulation. It will approach these issues through an assessment of 
explanations put forward to justify the growing importance of risks, well known risk theories 
such as cultural theory, risk society theory and governmentality theory. These theories will be 
considered against a background of themes such as dynamism, evolutionism, developments in 
science and industry, cultural attitudes to risk, and the need to be responsive and reflexive to 
changes which have arisen in modern society.  
 
Theoretical models and hybrids of a responsive model of regulation such as Enforced self 
regulation and meta regulation, which have the potential to address the problems relating to 
risk will be addressed. By virtue of the pro cyclical nature of risk, the inability of Basel 2 to 
address risk cycles were revealed during the Northern Rock Crisis. Other flaws and 
deficiencies inherent in Basel 2, a form of meta regulation, will be highlighted. The relevance 
of internal control systems to an efficient system of regulation, the reasons for which meta 
regulation is not only considered to be the most responsive form of regulation, but also one 
which assigns central role to internal control systems will be discussed.  
 
 
The contested nature of risk and the difficulties attributed to its quantification, raise questions 
about its ability to function effectively as a regulatory tool. If risks could be eliminated in 
their entirety however, then regulation would serve no purpose. This paper aims generally 
therefore to direct attention to those areas which could be addressed, namely institutional 
risks, and measures whereby such risks, even though impossible to eliminate, could be 
minimized. 
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BEYOND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: Addressing Risk Challenges in a Changing 
Financial Environment 
 
     Marianne Ojo1 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Factors such as the growth of financial conglomerates and the derivatives markets, which 
have been facilitated by the impact of information technology and increased competition 
within the financial services industry, have instigated a change in the way financial regulation 
is carried out around the world. A realisation by countries and their financial institutions that 
they were at a competitive disadvantage as globalisation gained momentum, lead to ultimate 
liberalisation in these countries.2  
 
As a result of the above mentioned global changes and developments, the benefits of financial 
regulation have not been realised to full potential since financial regulation also needs to 
evolve with changes such as the growth of financial conglomerates, social and economic 
changes. This has resulted in some arguments that regulation could also be detrimental.3 The 
reasons for differences in opinions between those who are in favour of regulation and 
supervision in finance and those who are against, focus around four key issues, namely:4 i) 
How financial institutions and markets work and operate in practice: This would require 
consideration of the domestic and global financial environment, ii) The incentive structures 
faced by financial firms iii) The extent of market imperfections and failures in the financial 
system and the power of regulation and supervision to address these , iv) the extent to which 
financial products and contracts are substantially different from goods and services which are 
not regulated to the same degree as financial institutions. 
 
The summer of 2007 signalled the start of events which culminated in the subsequent 
nationalisation of Northern Rock in the UK and the demise of Merill Lynch5 and Lehman 
Brothers. The unfolding of the mortgage crisis was revealed during this period and the crises 
deepened in 2007 and 2008 – resulting in turmoil for the global financial markets. 
 
The Financial Crisis, with particular reference to IKB and Hypo Real Estates in Germany, 
also revealed declining market confidence in banks’ stability.6 This was illustrated in cases 
where companies assured the public that they were unlikely to be affected by the Financial 
Crises, whilst in actual fact there was a high probability within the near future, and indeed 
within a few days, that they could be exposed – owing to their status as “liquidity providers 
for securities arbitrage conduits or as investors in complex re-securitisations.”7 Even though 
the Capital Requirements Directive, through its inclusion of a section on public disclosure 
requirements – aimed at strengthening “market’s understanding of banks’ risks and capital 
                                                 
1  Research Fellow, Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP), University of Bremen 
2  See OECD Report on Regulatory Reform 1997 Volume 1: Sectoral Studies at page 73 -74 
3  D Llewellyn ‘The Economic Rationale For Financial Regulation’ (1999) Financial Services Authority  
 London Occasional Paper 1 April 1999 at page 7 
4  ibid at page 5 
5   Merrill Lynch was taken over by the Bank of America. 
6  See “Disclosure of Securitisation Risks” COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
accompanying document to the Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitization issues and 
remuneration policies IMPACT ASSESSMENT, July 2009 at page 16 
 
7  ibid 
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positions”, provided for such a situation, such disclosure requirements entered into force at a 
period, which unfortunately, was rather late to contribute in any way in reducing the problems 
generated by the Financial Crisis.8 
 
 
The central theme of this paper revolves around problems encountered through the 
implementation of risk as a regulatory tool. In highlighting the susceptibility of a globalised 
world to globalised crisis, this paper will commence with a discussion which demonstrates the 
impact of risk and particularly, systemic risk, in regulation. The next section of the paper will 
then consider explanations which have been put forward to justify why risk has become so 
important – particularly in regulatory and governmental circles. These explanations are 
attributed to: Risk as an organising principle and, the increasing embeddedness of risk in 
regulation –whereby the increased connection between risk and regulation is becoming more 
apparent. Modes whereby risks are incorporated are then considered, namely, the 
transformation of internal controls to risk management, a quantitative process whereby 
societal risks are utilised and, a “qualitative shift towards the management of institutional 
risks.”9  
 
This will then set the scene for a discussion on various risk theories such as risk society 
theory, cultural theory, governmentality approach to risk, and the theory of risk colonisation. 
One of the difficulties associated with risk, as a regulatory tool, is attributed to its contested 
nature and the uncertainty which is associated with it. In order to address myths surrounding 
the quantification and control of risks, “risks must be made auditable and governable”.10 A 
means of quantifying risks, whereby institutional risks constitute the focus, as regards those 
risks which are being quantified, is discussed. Whilst the audit risk model has its merits, its 
disadvantages are also considered. 
 
The advantages of traditional regulation and means whereby its deficiencies can be addressed, 
are then considered in the subsequent section. Meta regulation, the regulation of self 
regulation11 ,a form of regulation whose “collaborative approach to rule generation” is 
considered to be the most evolved approach, and reasons why it could be the most responsive 
form of regulation, will then constitute the topic of discussion. Basel II, an example of meta 
regulation, will then be introduced with particular focus on capital adequacy. As well as the 
vital role assumed by capital in containing risk in a banking firm, protecting deposits and 
equalising competition amongst banks12, capital adequacy is considered to be fundamental to 
prudential supervision as its constitutes part of its foundations. Its significance to risk 
management and persisting problems which Basel II presents, will be considered with 
reference to the recent crisis, and particularly to the pro cyclical nature of risk. Having 
considered all these crucial topics, a conclusion which comprises efforts which have been 
undertaken as a means of addressing regulatory flaws which were highlighted during the 
recent crises and further proposals which need to be effected, will then be drawn.  
 
                                                 
8  ibid 
9  See H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell, ‚A Theory of Risk Colonisation: The Spiralling Regulatory 
Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk“ (2006) Economy and Society (35)1 at page 92 
10  See M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos 
at page 10; also see U Beck, Risk Society – Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992) 
11  See the penultimate chapter of Christine Parker’s book, C Parker The Open Corporation: Effective Self- 
Regulation and Democracy. 2002 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
12  SeeD Quiroz Rendon ‚The Formal Regulatory Approach to Banking Regulation’ 
http://www.badellgrau.com/legalbanking.html (last visited 10 June 2009) pages 10 and 11 
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B.  The Significance of Risk in Regulation 
 
The rationale for financial regulation is an embodiment of two issues namely:13  
 
I. The problem of systemic risk14:  
II. The problem of asymmetric information whereby certain information is known to 
some people but not to others15. 
 
Systemic risk is referred to as the risk that the failure of one firm may affect others, resulting 
in the collapse of the financial system.16 Consequences emanating from the systemic impact 
of the financial sector on the real economy were, once again, brought to light during the 
recent financial crisis, as evidenced by its impact on economic recovery.17  Measures aimed at 
combating systemic risks and rejuvenating market confidence have been classified into two, 
namely:18 “A first line of defence against systemic liquidity risk”19 and “a second line of 
defence against systemic solvency risk.”20  
 
 
As well as reasons attributed to the rationale for financial regulation, other explanations which 
have been put forward to explain why risk has become central across regulatory and 
governmental circles are partly influenced by different approaches as to what risk is. Further 
explanations, mainly from socio-cultural disciplines suggest that the importance of risk 
derives from issues related to control, accountability, responsibility and blame in late modern 
society.21 
 
Two well-known theoretical perspectives addressing these are termed “risk society” theory 
and “governmentality” theory.22 
 
                                                 
13 Speech by Howard Davies, former chairman , Financial Services Authority 'Building the FSA – 
Progress to Date and Priorities Ahead' Wednesday 30 September 1998 <http:// www.fsa.gov.uk> ( last visited 10 
June 2008 ) 
14 Regulation for systemic reasons is required when the social costs of the failure of financial institutions 
(particularly banks) exceed private costs and such potential social costs are not provided for in the decision 
making of the firm. Social costs could arise from systemic situations triggered by a bank run (withdrawal of 
deposits by depositors) which may have contagious effects on other banks.  D Llewellyn 'The Economic 
Rationale For Financial Regulation'  (Financial Services Authority London Occasional Paper 1 April 1999 p 13  
15 Ibid; Market failures include information problems, externalities and conflict of interests.  
16  P Cartwright, Bankers, Consumers and Regulation 2004 Hart Publishing at pg 192 
17  See JC Trichet „Remarks on the Future of European Financial Regulation and Supervision“, Address by  
 the President of the European Central Bank at the Committee of European Securities Regulators  
 (CESR) , 23 February 2009, page 1 of 5. 
18  Ibid at page 2 
19  Instruments which fall under the first line of defence include an increase in “the size and frequency of 
liquidity operations, extending the list of collateral, significantly expanding balance sheets and implementing 
unprecedented interest rate cuts.” See ibid 
20  This includes re capitalisation, guarantees and asset support schemes; see ibid. 
21  J Gray and  J Hamilton  Implementing Financial Regulation ( 2006) p 5; also see T Bennett ‘Culture and 
Governmentality’ in C McCarthy and J Packer (eds) Foucault, Cultural Studies and Governmentality 2003) State 
University of New York Press at page 47; M Dean, Governmentality. Power and Rule in Modern Society (1999) 
London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage 1999 and  
M Douglas, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (1992) Routledge  
22 See U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications and M Foucault, 
‘Governmentality’ in G Burchell et al (eds), The Foucault Effect at pages 87-104, also J Bratich, J Packer and C 
McCarthy Foucault, Cultural Studies and Governmentality (2003) State University of New York Press 
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C. Explanations to Why Risk Has Become So Important 
 
I. Risk As a Strategic Organising Principle 
 
In considering the features that make risk such a vital tool for regulation, Rothstein et al 
conclude that ….”risk provides an organizing concept for societal decision-making under 
uncertainty and is a key characteristic of modernity….as regulatory systems attempt to control 
events that have formerly been beyond control, the process of decision-making transforms 
those events into risks as a way of rationally managing the limits of regulation.”23 
 
As well as a means of describing what constitutes the subjects of regulation and related 
institutional threats, risk is increasingly being perceived as a procedure for the organisation of 
regulatory activities.24  
 
 
 
II. The Embeddedness of Risk in Regulation 
 
The increasing connection between risk and regulation is apparent.25 Such fact is collaborated 
by the transformation of internal controls to risk management.26 It is maintained that the 
transformation of risk into internal controls is required for the operation of risk-based 
regulation, which in turn would facilitate the functioning of the risk management state.27 
According to Rothstein28 et al, the incorporation of risks in regulatory processes has taken 
place in two ways namely: Through a quantitative process whereby risk analysis and risk 
management methods are increasingly being utilised in the regulation of “traditional and 
novel” risks, such risks being referred to as “societal risks”29. 
 
The second mode of incorporation involves the “qualitative shift towards the management of 
institutional risks”.30 There has been an increased focus on the risks of risk management.31 
Such consequence of risk management has been referred to as the “duality of risk”.32 
 
                                                 
23  H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell “A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory 
Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk” (2006) Economy and Society (35) 1 at page 99 
24  ibid at page 97 
25  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
pages 50-58 
26  Also see ibid at page 24 
27  ibid  
28  H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell “A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory 
Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk” (2006) Economy and Society (35) 1 at page 92 
29  ibid 
30  ibid; institutional risks are implied to include risks encountered by institutions which are responsible for 
managing and regulating societal risks and/or legitimacy risks (to their rules and practices) - regardless of 
whether these institutions are state or non state institutions. 
31  ibid; See also M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of 
Uncertainty2004 Demos at pages 50-58 in which Power argues that reliance on internal controls may increase 
risk if it leads to an undermining of the knowledge of risk in other areas; despite the benefits of risk 
management, concerns are generated due to the fact that secondary risk management has become an accepted 
“organisational common sense” - reflecting the society’s loss in faith in its professions and public organisations. 
32  ibid and also see C Ciborra, ‘Digital Technologies and the Duality of Risk’(2004) CARR Discussion 
Paper No 27, CARR, LSE London 
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However, the ever increasing inter connectedness between risk and regulation does not mean 
that both perfectly correspond to one another.33 This has given rise to compliance related 
issues for organisations. 
 
Corporate governance tools are considered to be risk management strategies for the distinctive 
risk of failure by senior management to prevent the growth and development of risk.34 
Modern risk management strategies have arisen from new institutions involved in the 
collection and statistical analysis of data required for activities like the census.35 
 
In his speech to the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA) EU 
Corporate Governance Summit, Charles McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal 
Market and Services, highlighted the fact that it was apparent that:36 
“poor, indeed, sometimes disastrous, risk management by financial institutions was partly to 
blame for the current financial turmoil. Risk management should be part of the strategy of the 
firm, and indeed the culture of the organisation. It is the duty of senior management in 
financial institutions to address this and it is the role of the board to oversee it. In their 
respective roles, both senior management and the board need to ensure a holistic approach to 
firm-wide – and group-wide -risk management.” 
 
 
 
D. Risk Theories 
 
I. Risk Society 
 
The theme of evolutionism is common to various theories of ‘simple’ modernisation.37 
However, a  different perspective is observed by Beck who views risks and unpredictability as 
the consequences of developments of science and industry.38 Furthermore, he argues that no 
one can be brought to book for unpredictable events in the “risk society”.39 Furthermore, the 
ability of regulators to regulate successfully depends on the level of efficiency and coherence 
of “institutionally complex regulatory regimes”, hence the limited ability of regulators to 
control societal risks.40 In Beck’s view, modernization must become reflexive and such 
modernization not only involves structural change, but a dynamic relationship between social 
structures and social agents.41 Along with others, Beck argues that risks of late modernity 
differ in type and magnitude from those which previously existed.42  Furthermore they 
                                                 
33  See B Hutter and M Power “Risk Management and Business Regulation” at page 2 
34  M Power Organized Uncertainty: Designing A World of Risk Management 2007 Oxford University 
Press at page 10 
35  ibid at page 12 
36  See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/518&format=HTML&aged=0&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
37 See U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications at page 2. Such 
theories range from those of Habermas to Max to Parsonian sociology. 
38  ibid at page 2 
39  ibid; In contrast to societal risks, Rothstein et al maintain that it is much easier to account for 
institutional risks through the transformation of behaviours and outcomes that could not be recorded previously 
or were considered to be acceptable. See H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: 
The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk at page 96 
40  ibid at page 95 
41  ibid 
42  See H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory 
Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk at page 94 
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maintain that, in the ‘risk society’ in which we now live, risks are no longer imposed from 
external sources but are ‘manufactured’ as “products of mankind’s decisions, options, science, 
politics, industries, markets and capital.”43 
 
II. Cultural Theory 
 
Cultural theorists on the other hand, argue that attitudes to risk differ according to cultural 
preferences.44 However, it is argued that it is highly unlikely that cultural theory would be 
able to predict risk perceptions in particular situations.45 Cultural theory proceeds with the 
assumption that a culture consists of persons which hold one another mutually to account. 46 
There is an attempt by such persons to live at a level of being held accountable, which is 
identical to a level at which such a person would want to hold others accountable.47 From this 
perspective, culture is ladened with political implications of mutual accountability.48 Rather 
than the perception that an isolated individual would check every piece of information in such 
a manner devoid of prejudice or moral commitment, the person is perceived to investigate 
possible information “through a collectively constructed censor set to a given standard of 
accountability.” Since assimilated knowledge or the rejection of “mere noise” is based on a 
criterion which considers whether the new conception or fact will consolidate the subject’s 
preferred political scheme, in Douglas’ opinion, it would be fruitless to undertake a study of 
risk perception without a systematic consideration of cultural preferences.49 
 
 
III. Governmentality Approach to Risk 
 
The “governmentality” theory is related to the work of Foucault.50 According to his approach, 
risk is generally considered to be a concept which is socially produced in its entirety.51 
Furthermore, no external environment compels society to respond to risk.52 A broader view of 
government, which the notion of governmentality embraces, can be found in Mitchell Dean’s 
definition of government: 
 
“Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a 
multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms 
of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, 
interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively 
unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes”.53 
 
                                                 
43  Also see R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) 
Oxford University Press at page 141 
44  ibid at 142 
45  S Ottedal, B Moen, H Klempe and T Rundow ‘Explaining Risk Perception: An evaluation of Cultural 
Theory’ < http://www.svt.ntnu.no/psy/Torbjorn.Rundmo/Psychometric_paradigm.pdf> 
46  M Douglas ‘Risk and Blame’ Routlegde at page 31 
47  ibid 
48  ibid 
49  ibid at pages 31 and 32 
50  See M Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ in G Burchell et al (eds), The Foucault Effect at pages 87-104, also 
J Bratich, J Packer and C McCarthy Foucault, Cultural Studies and Governmentality (2003) State University of 
New York Press  
51  See J Zinn, ‘Recent Developments in Sociology of Risk and Uncertainty’ (2005) at page 4 
52  ibid 
53 See T Bennett ‘Culture and Governmentality’ in C McCarthy and J Packer (eds) Foucault, Cultural Studies 
and Governmentality 2003) State University of New York Press at page 47; M Dean, Governmentality. Power 
and Rule in Modern Society (1999) London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage 1999 at page 11 
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IV. Theory of Risk Colonisation 
 
This theory is founded on the dynamic linkage between societal and institutional risks - 
thereby paving the way for a new explanatory model of “contemporary regulatory 
development” which recommends a research schedule for the study of the separate fields of 
risk and regulation.54 It is also an attempt to explain what is considered to be some of the 
“conceptual consequences” of efforts aimed at regulating risk.55 
 
V. Criticisms of Risk Theories 
 
Criticism which revolves round Beck’s concept of risk is namely, that risk is too restricted in 
accounting for complexities involving governmental risk strategies and rationalities or socio 
cultural perceptions and responses to risk.56 A wider approach which is in line with the 
concept of reflexive modernization commences with uncertainty instead of risk.57 The 
distinction between risk and uncertainty is as follows: Risk is traditionally associated with 
probability calculation and this suggests that an event can be predicted and controlled.58 
Uncertainty however is not capable of measurement and deals with possibilities incapable of 
calculation which are based on guesswork and judgment.59 It is also added that uncertainty 
has to be defined acknowledging the possibility of unpredictable outcomes rather than 
adopting an approach which aims to transform uncertainty into certainty.60 
 
The functionalist view on risk, that is those works which are frequently related to those of 
Douglas and Wildavsky, is principally criticised for its oversimplified interpretation of quite 
complicated and ever changing processes  of how risk is approached.61 The ‘socio-cultural’ 
approach and ‘risk culture’ try to address the functionalist view on risk by targeting more 
complex and changing processes which involve risk in every day life.62 One advantage of 
these approaches is namely, that responses to risk are generated.63 
 
 
E. Quantification of Risks 
 
The focus placed on the quantification of risks in various jurisdictions, varies according to the 
degree to which the decision making processes are subject to legal challenge and review, and 
whether there has been a tradition of independent regulatory agencies.64  
 
In order to overcome the myths surrounding the quantification and control of risks, “risks 
must be made auditable and governable.”65 In the attempt to make risk auditable, the role 
                                                 
54  Rothstein et al at page 107 
55  ibid at page 108 
56  See J Zinn, ‘Recent Developments in Sociology of Risk and Uncertainty’ (2005) at page 1 
57  ibid, also see W Bonss, Vom Risiko: Unsicherheit und Ungewissheit in der Moderne (1995) Hamburg: 
Hamburger Edition 
58 J Gray and J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice  (2006) 20 
59 ibid 
60  see See J Zinn, ‘Recent Developments in Sociology of Risk and Uncertainty’ (2005) at page 2 
61  ibid at page 3 
62  ibid 
63  ibid 
64  H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory 
Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk at page 101 
65  See M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos 
at page 10; also see U Beck, Risk Society – Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992) 
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assumed by risk management has been transformed to that which is synonymous with that of 
an appropriately managed organisation which is internally and externally in control of the way 
it “handles” uncertainty.66 
 
 
Since societal risks are difficult to quantify, it could be argued that focus should be placed on 
preventing, detecting and rectifying the effects of institutional risks. Moreover, societal risks 
(excluding those risks attributed to “force majeure”), it can be argued, are consequential of 
the systemic effects of institutional risks. Hence the control of the source (that is, institutional 
risks) would be an effective way of containing the uncontrollable effects of societal risks.67 
Risk management of institutional risks, even though this generates risks (which are the 
consequence of an omission of other significant risks), can be undertaken using the audit risk 
model – especially since the assessment of risks, based on differences in perceptions68, is so 
subjective. 
 
Successful management of institutional risks is dependent on many factors, namely, accuracy 
– inaccurate assessments of societal risks may further exacerbate the difficulty in managing 
institutional risks.69 Furthermore, methodological challenges and the degree to which other 
decision shaping factors are aligned the success of risk management, also contribute to the 
effectiveness of the management of institutional risks.70 Even where institutional risks which 
emanate from the government and the judiciary are successfully managed through risk based 
procedures, there may still be exposure to institutional risks from external sources.71 
 
 
The audit risk model not only requires the auditor to have an understanding of the client’s 
business and industry, systems used in processing transactions, qualifications of personnel 
engaged in accounting procedures, policies related to preparation of client’s financial 
statements but also requires that auditors have a knowledge of company’s internal controls.72 
 
Traditional auditing techniques involve auditors performing tests to find out the level of risks 
which may exist in an entity. These risks consist of three components namely: inherent risks, 
                                                 
66  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
page 40 
67  Whilst Power has argued that societal and institutional risk management are closely related, Rothstein et 
al contend that institutional risk management is stimulated by the ‘residual failures of societal risk management’ 
and that a focus on institutional risk management could also define the perception and management of societal 
risks. In other words, they emphasize the importance of concentrating not only on the management of societal 
risks, but also on the management of institutional risks. See H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell ‘A Theory of 
Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk at page 103 
68  Attitudes to risk vary with individuals and may be different at different levels of an organization. “Risk 
attitudes or appetites may also vary across different aspects of the same risk, may in reality not correspond to any 
stated appetite and may change with new or better information.” See M Power, The Risk Management of 
Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at pages 19 and 20. Also see B Hutter, Risk and 
Regulation (2000) Oxford: Oxford University Press 
69  H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory 
Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk at page 101 
70  ibid 
71  ibid at 102 
72  ‘The Audit Risk Model’ <http://www.pobauditpanel.org/downloads/appendixa.pdf> at pages 175,176 (last 
visited 25 March 2009); also see <http://www.aicpa.org/download/members/div/auditstd/SAS107.PDF> page 5 
of 20 
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control risks and detection risks and they all contribute to the audit risk73.  The audit risk 
models is denoted by the following equation: 
 
 AR = IR * CR*DR (where AR represents audit risk, IR represents inherent risk, CR 
represents control risk and DR represents detection risk) 
 
Inherent risks74 are those risks which emanate as a result of the nature of the business entity, 
control risks75 are those risks resulting from reliance on the internal controls functioning 
within the business whilst detection risk is the risk that the auditor would not be able to detect 
material misstatements during procedures aimed at detecting such. 
 
Inherent and control risks are outside the control of  auditors and since these risks are outside 
auditors' control, the consequence is that the higher the assessed levels of inherent and control 
risk, the lower the detection risk must be if the desired overall level of audit risk is to be 
achieved.76 The level of detection risk can be varied through auditors increasing substantive 
procedures, that is statistical sampling.77 Substantive  procedures are usually costly and 
auditors who place reliance on the internal controls in order to support the reduced use of 
substantive procedures need to show that the assessed level of control risk is low.78 This is 
done through the performance of tests of controls. Where internal control weaknesses are 
discovered, this does not necessarily mean that more tests of control should be performed. 
Where performance of such tests of control would not be potentially cost-effective, the use of 
predominantly substantive procedures is recommended straightaway.79 A preliminary 
determination of the control risk is required where there is potential for cost effectiveness. If 
this pre determined risk is high, then a predominantly  substantive approach is recommended. 
If the control risk is low, then test of the internal controls are to be performed to confirm the 
preliminary assessment of control risk. Following confirmation of a low pre determined level 
of control risk, a reduced level of substantive procedures can then be carried out.80  
 
Materiality is provided for in the audit risk model as auditors are not required to account for 
every misstatement within a financial statement – only material misstatements need be 
accounted for.81 Furthermore, the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures is vital to the 
model. Auditors are also required to ascertain “fraud risks” which take into consideration 
qualities of both inherent and control risk.82 
 
Whilst according to some, the audit risk model has been relatively successful, its focus on 
internal use has been said to contribute to the existence of inherent problems in external 
                                                 
73 This is defined as the probability that an auditor may unknowingly fail to adjust an opinion which is 
materially misstated in the financial statements; U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Report on Financial Statement 
Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses and Remaining Challenges  (2002) page p 38 
74 Inherent risk can also be defined as the susceptibility of an account balance to material error; ibid p 38 
75 Risk that error could occur and not be prevented or detected by internal controls 
76 See  G Cosserat, 'Audit Strategy'  1 February 1999, 
<http://www.accaglobal.com/publications/studentaccountant/49870> 
77 ibid 
78 ibid 
79 ibid 
80 See  G Cosserat, 'Audit Strategy'  1 February 1999, 
<http://www.accaglobal.com/publications/studentaccountant/49870> 
81  Also see ‘The Audit Risk Model’ <http://www.pobauditpanel.org/downloads/appendixa.pdf > at page 
177 
82  ibid 
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procedures.83 This was soon highlighted in a study on expectations gap, following its 
introduction.84 
 
 
F. Traditional Regulation 
 
I. Advantages of Traditional Regulation 
 
Although command and control regulation has been criticized for its rigidity, such rigidity 
having contributed to economic inefficiency, Latin suggests that this approach has 
advantages.85 Furthermore, these advantages extend beyond those advantages identified with 
more tailored and flexible instruments.86 
 
 
 
II. Addressing the Deficiencies of Traditional Regulation 
 
“Responsive regulation is distinguished (from other strategies of market governance) both in 
what triggers a regulatory response and what the regulatory response will be”.87 Ayres and 
Braithwaite also propose that regulation be responsive to industry structure – since different 
structures will be conducive to different degrees and forms of regulation.88 According to 
Baldwin and Black89, in order to be “really responsive”, regulators are required to be 
responsive - not only to the level of compliance of the regulatee, but also to the frameworks 
within the firms – both operating and cognitive, to the environment which encompasses the 
regulatory regime, which is broader and institutional, to the different ways whereby 
regulatory tools and strategies operate, to the performance of the regime and ultimately, to 
changes which exist within each of the mentioned elements. Regulation, it is argued, is 
responsive when it knows its regulatees and its environments, when it is capable of coherently 
organizing different and new regulatory modes of reasoning, when it is sensitive to 
performance and when it recognizes what its changing challenges are.90 Baldwin and Black’s 
opinion of what is really responsive would have to take into consideration the growing impact 
of risk.91 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83  TJ Andersen, ‘Perspectives on Strategic Risk Management’ (2006) Copenhagen Business School Press 
Denmark at pages 95 and 96 
84  ibid 
85  N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : 
Clarendon Press at page 42 
86 ibid; also see H Latin ‘Ideal versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and 
“Fine Tuning” Reforms’ (1985) 37 Stanford Law Review at page 1271 
87  Ayres  and  Braithwaite, Responsive  Regulation   p  4 
 
 
88   ibid 
89  R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 15/2007 at pages 3 and 4 
90  ibid 
91  See M Ojo ‘The Growing Importance of Risk in Regulation’ Munich Personal Archive (2009) < 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13723/> 
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G.  Responsive Regulation v Risk Based Regulation 
Theoretically, regulatory regimes can become more responsive to the self-organisation of 
regulatees regardless of whether such regulates are banks or local government service 
providers.92 Risk based regulation, in Power’s view, is considered to be a blue print for the 
“risk management state.”93 
 
In comparison to responsive regulation, risk based regulation is relatively new.94 It has been 
adopted by several regulatory agencies as a means of organising resource allocation, 
managing limited resources and concentrating those resources where they are needed most – 
for example, in cases involving banks with weak internal controls.95 Such an approach is 
strategic and goal oriented at the same time.96 The link between risk and strategy is vital in 
advertising new regulatory approaches and risk management and would also improve 
communication between the regulator and the regulated.97 
 
Responsive regulation is distinguished from risk based regulation since the latter focuses on 
analysis and targeting rather than a process of “responsive escalation”.98 Whilst the 
framework of risk based approaches not only enables regulators to link enforcement-related 
activities to the achievement of objectives, but also allows for the targeting of resources in 
such a way which prioritises the highest risks, the main controversial issue surrounding risk 
based regulation relates to inspection. 
 
 
Furthermore, risk based regulation is an embodiment of the idea that regulatory failures are 
possible – in contrast with the concept of zero tolerance.99 Whilst some events can be 
classified as being of “zero-tolerance” nature, such an event as that of the fall of Equitable 
Life, which could be considered as ‘tolerable’ from the perspective of a systemic financial 
risk, in fact, generated life changing catastrophic consequences for many.100 
 
 
Other problems which relate to risk based regulation derive from the fact that “drivers of 
action” are short term random and irrational considerations, focus is not necessarily given to 
the most important risks, there is likelihood that risk based systems will tend to neglect lower 
levels of risk, which may aggregate to risks of immense and dangerous proportions.101 
 
 
 
                                                 
92  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
page 21 
93  ibid 
94  See H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell, ‘A Theory of Risk Colonisation’ (2006) 35 (1) Economy and 
Society at page 91 
95  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
page 21 
96  ibid 
97  ibid 
98  See R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working  
 Papers 15/2007 at page 12 
99  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
page 22 
100  ibid 
101  R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working  
 Papers 15/2007 at pages 13 - 14 
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H. Meta Regulation 
I. Why Meta Regulation Could Be the Most Responsive Form of Regulation  
 
Regulation may be regarded as a response to risk102 and the control of risks can be considered 
to be the main concern of regulation.103 “The regulatory state is becoming a risk management 
state”104. Ulrich Beck argues that whilst the standard way of risk regulation in modern 
societies was well suited for such societies, it is not responsive enough to our “post modern” 
societies.105 Risk is, as a result, inefficiently controlled at too high a cost.106 Recent years 
have witnessed growing acceptance of the fact that the efficiency of regulation will be 
enhanced where a collaboration with private control systems exists.107 By utilising activities 
which relate to private internal control systems for purposes which are of public regulatory 
nature, regulators are not only able to relieve themselves of the cumbersome work which 
derives from rule making, but are also able to concentrate on the oversight of the functioning 
and design of local systems.108 ‘Enforced self regulation’, ‘regulated self-regulation’ and 
‘meta regulation’ are various forms which a responsive model may assume and  such a model 
assigns a central role to internal control systems.109 Basel II bank regulation reforms 
constitute an example of meta regulation. 
 
Meta regulation is referred to as the regulation of self regulation110 whilst meta risk 
management implies the risk management of risk management. Traditionally risk 
management, to a large extent, has focused on complying with current rules.111 It has great 
potential especially in situations where risks are volatile and where the regulator is not in a 
                                                 
102  U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications ; also see C Hood, 
H Rothstein and R Baldwin The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk (2001) Oxford University Press  
103  R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford 
University Press at page 138 
104  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
page 23 and also see B Fischoff, SR Watson and C Hope ‘ Defining Risk’ Policy Sciences 17 (1984) 
105 See U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications and also M Lassagne 
and B Munier, ‘The Move Towards Risk-Based Regulation and Its Impact on Operational and Strategic 
Management’ see< http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca/activites/050930/papers/munier.pdf> (last visited 17th March 
2009) According to Ulrich Beck and other sociologists’ considerations of the “risk society”, nature does not play 
a role in generating risks in the sense that risks are no longer the consequence of external or uncontrollable 
factors such as “force majeure” but are generated through man made decisions. Cultural theorists however, argue 
that attitudes to risk differ according to cultural preferences. See R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding 
Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University Press at page 141. Also see M Douglas 
Risk and Blame (1992) London 
106  It can be observed from daily occurrence that more attention should be devoted to recent evolution 
toward risk based regulation, examples of which can be found in recent European and partly Western-rule setting 
as illustrated by the Basel II agreement on the regulation of risks in banking and the European Commission 
White Paper on how to regulate risk in the chemical industry. For more information on this, see M Lassagne and 
B Munier, ‘The Move Towards Risk-Based Regulation and Its Impact on Operational and Strategic 
Management’ <http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca/activites/050930/papers/munier.pdf >(last visited 17th March 
2009) 
107  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
page 21. 
108  ibid 
109  ibid; Also see E Rosa, ‘Meta Theoretical Foundations For Post Normal Risk’ Journal of Risk Research 
1 (1998) 
110  See the penultimate chapter of Christine Parker’s book, C Parker The Open Corporation: Effective Self- 
Regulation and Democracy. 2002 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
111  M Lassagne and B Munier, ‘The Move Towards Risk-Based Regulation and Its Impact on Operational 
and Strategic Management’ see http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca/activites/050930/papers/munier.pdf (last visited 
17th March 2009) 
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position to comprehend such risks.112 However maximum realisation of such potential can 
only occur only where such risks are within the control of an enterprise where the regulator 
holds an influential position.113 
 
As was mentioned in the above paragraph, over the years, there has been a trend towards 
greater regulation of business management processes and strategies of regulated firms through 
regulatory tools which address the role of senior managements of firms and directly regulate 
individuals within firms.114 According to Fiona Haynes115, meta regulation “with its 
collaborative approach to rule generation”, could controversially be considered to be the 
approach with greatest evolvement when considered in relation to other approaches such as 
co-regulation, enforced self regulation and process or management-based regulation. Meta 
regulation is a method which is capable of managing “self regulatory capacity” within those 
sites being regulated whilst exercising governmental discretion in stipulating the goals and 
levels of risk reduction to be achieved in regulation.116 Processes and procedures for risk 
management are developed, not only by key stake holders, but also by personnel within these 
organisations.117 This takes place whilst ensuring that “pro-compliance motivational postures” 
are generated within the site being regulated such that the goal of the regulator, that is, risk 
reduction, is achieved.118 The success of the implementation of meta regulation is based on 
the regulator and regulated organisation’s understanding of risk priorities in the same 
manner.119 Meta regulation is advantageous particularly where there are complex causes of 
harm, which also require constant monitoring.120 The disadvantages of meta regulation are not 
only attributed to its use of mathematical models, but also attempts to leverage off firms’ own 
systems and expertise, as a means of limiting risks to the regulator’s objectives – rather than 
directly imposing requirements on firms.121 
 
 
The increasing popularity of internal control systems has been an express feature of risk 
management.122 Primary or real risks123 are translated by internal control systems into 
systems risks such as early warning mechanisms and compliance violation alerts.124 As a 
result, many risks are capable of being and are being “operationalised” as organisational 
processes of control.125 Such transformation is a pre requisite for the feasibility of risk based
126
 
gulation.  
                                                
re
 
112  J Braithwaite, Meta Risk Management and Responsive Governance Paper to Risk Regulation, 
Accountability and Development Conference, University of Manchester, 26-27 June 2003 at page 1 
113 ibid 
114 J Gray and  J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation  (John Wiley and Sons Ltd 2006 at page 2 
115  F Haines,‘Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of 
Disaster’, Law and Social Inquiry ( 2009) 39 (forthcoming) at page 3 
116  ibid at page 1 
117  ibid at page 3; Also see C Parker The Open Corporation: Effective Self- Regulation and Democracy. 
2002 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
118  ibid 
119 F Haines,‘Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of 
Disaster’, Law and Social Inquiry ( 2009) 39 (forthcoming) at page 17 
120  ibid at page 1 
121  For further information on this, see J Gray and J Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation  (John 
Wiley and Sons Ltd 2006 at pages 38 and 216 
122  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
page 24 
123  Primary risks, for example financial loss are distinguished from secondary risk (reputational  risk) see 
ibid at page 32 
124 ibid at page 24 
125  ibid 
126  ibid 
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I. The Centrality of Capital Adequacy to Risk Measurements and Persisting Problems of 
Basel II. 
pulated for 
the minimum capital requirements if their individual risk situation so demands.127  
t 
nction, stress testing requirements, and the Pillar Two – the supervisory review process.130 
hould act at an early stage to prevent capital 
om falling below stipulated minimum levels. 
In response to the deficiency of Basel 1, and given the fact that the measurement of minimum 
capital requirements is based on a general assessment of risk dispersion in the banking sector 
which does not correspond in every case to the specific circumstances of individual 
institutions, credit institutions will be required to retain more capital than that sti
A consequence of one of the primary objectives of the framework of Basel II, which was 
directed at making capital requirements more risk sensitive, is that the capital requirements 
became more cyclical periodically, than was the case under Basel I.128 Such increased pro 
cyclicality had been anticipated and hence, the Capital Requirements Directive already 
provides for situations involving increased pro cyclicality through the inclusion of measures 
aimed at reducing such effects.129Such measures include the use of downturn Loss Given 
Default (LGD) estimates, adjustments which can be made technically to the risk weigh
fu
 
Pillar Two namely supervisory review consists of four principles.131 Principle 1 states that 
banks should have a means of determining their overall capital adequacy in relation to their 
risk profile and also a plan for sustaining their capital levels and that these processes require 
board and senior management oversight, sound capital assessment, a comprehensive risk 
management system, monitoring and review, internal control review. Principle 2 states that 
supervisors should review and evaluate banks' internal capital adequacy determinants and 
plans and also their ability to monitor and ensure compliance with regulatory capital ratios. 
Supervisors should also take necessary supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the 
outcome of this process.  Pillar Two could also include the combination of on-site 
examinations or inspections; off-site review; discussions with bank management and review 
of external auditors' work (as long as it sufficiently focuses on necessary capital matters) and 
periodic reporting.132 Principle 3 states  that supervisors should require banks to operate 
above the minimum regulatory capital ratio and also that banks hold capital in excess of the 
minimum. Principle 4 states that supervisors s
fr
 
During periods when risks are considered to be lower, namely, during economic booms, the 
tendency of banks to indulge in greater levels of risk taking activities, tends to augment. 
Owing to tighter lending criteria during economic downswings, “feedback effects” may be 
                                                 
127  ibid 
128  See Annex on Procyclicality ,COMMISS
document to the Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF T
ION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT accompanying 
HE COUNCIL 
ndin ital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitization issues and remuneration policies 
ACT ESSMENT, July 2009, page 45 < 
://ec
ame g Cap
IMP  ASS
http .europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf>  
129  ibid 
130  ibid 
131 K Alexander,  'Corporate Governance and Basel II'' (paper presented at the Institute of Advanced Leg
Studies, Russell Square on the 7th October 2004) 
132 ibid 
al 
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generated for the real economy.133 Pro cyclical problems were revealed following the collapse 
of Northern Rock where it was highlighted that it was complying with Basel capital 
requirements and had excess capital on the eve of its crash.134 Another problem identified 
with Northern Rock was that it had high leverage – relying heavily on debt to finance its 
ssets.135 
n the cases involving non compliance.138 Such 
atters are to be decided at national level.139 
. Conclusion 
me lessons from the Financial Crisis of 2007/08 indicated flaws in the following areas:140  
et discipline : This was ineffective in constraining risk taking outside the banking 
 between regulated and unregulated institutions activities (such as 
edge funds), and markets. 
                                                
a
 
 
Other criticisms directed towards Basel 2 include supervisory discretion – that this could 
result to regulatory capture, that it is excessively risk sensitive, that its capital formula is too 
prescriptive and complex and that it is not well-suited for 90% of the world's population.136  
Further, even though Basel 2, which is embodied in EU legislation137, sets out what should be 
considered under Pillars 2 and 3, it does not provide directions to authorities of members 
states regarding what steps are to be taken i
m
 
 
J
 
So
: 
• Mark
sector 
• An underestimation of the systemic importance of some non banks institutions 
• That regulators (and supervisors) failed to take adequate account of the systemic risks 
presented by the interaction
h
 
According to Brunnermeier et al141 failures such as Northern Rock, Lehman Brothers and 
Bear Stearns were triggered not only by their inability to transfer their liabilities (funding 
illiquidity), but also their inability to sell mortgage products at “non-fire sale-prices” (market 
illiquidity). The extent to which the maturity of funding determines the risk of an asset is an 
 
N STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT accompanying 
HE COUNCIL 
133  See Annex on Procyclicality ,COMMISSIO
document to the Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF T
amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitization issues and remuneration policies 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT, July 2009 at page 44 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> 
134 see S Cociuba, ‘Seeking Stability: What’s Next for Banking Regulation?’ Northern Rock had obtain
approval from the Financial Services Authority to switch to Basel II advanced approach in ord
ed 
er to calculate risk 
ing Stability: What’s Next for Banking Regulation? 
g new equity or selling assets to repay some debt, Northern 
te of Advanced Legal 
ies, ll Square on the 7  October 2004) 
erimenter of Financial Regulation’ (2009) SPN/09/07 at page 4 of 17 
p://w ernal/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0907.pdf
weights for its assets using the bank’s internal models. In December 2006, its capital ration was 11.6 under Basel 
I calculations but this jumped to 17.5 under Basel II. In June 2007, this had risen to 18.2%; for further 
information on this see S Cociuba, ‘Seek
135  Ibid; Leverage is pro cyclical – being high during booms and low during downturns. Whilst some other 
institutions adjusted their balance sheets by raisin
rock did not reduce its debt; ibid. 
136 K Alexander,  'Corporate Governance and Basel II'  (paper presented at the Institu
thStud Russe
137 Through the Capital Requirements’ Directive 
138 See D Mayes and G Wood, ‘Lessons From the Northern Rock Episode’ at page 17 
139  ibid 
140 See A Carvajal and others ‘The P
<htt ww.imf.org/ext  >(last visited 18 May 2009) 
he World Economy 11’, 141  See ‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva Reports on t
Preliminary Draft 2009 at page 36 
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important  lesson from the Crash of 2007/2008.142 A reason attributed to Northern Rock’s 
vulnerability was its excessive reliance on wholesale funds.143 “Wholesale funds are obtained 
from non financial corporations, money market mutual funds, foreign entities and other 
financial institutions. Typically, the funds are raised on a short-term basis through instruments 
uch as certificates of deposit, commercial paper, repurchase agreements and federal 
nds.”144 
 Risks are Actually Provided for by Basel II? 
nd Working Group and the US-based Asset 
anagers’ Committee and Investors’ Committee with the aim of increasing transparency and 
also considered the prudential requirements to which prime brokers were subject, to be 
s
fu
 
 
I. What Proportion of
 
1. Hedge Funds 
 
The main purpose of Basel I and Basel II focuses round the incorporation of risks. As a 
starting point, it needs to be stated that risks cannot be eliminated – they can only be 
minimised. If risks were eliminated, then regulation would serve no purpose. Concerns remain 
over hedge funds as this is an area where regulators have limited jurisdiction. Many regulators 
do not authorise such funds and most of the administrators of these hedge funds are located 
offshore.145 In March 2008, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) during its 19th meeting, 
considered efforts by the hedge fund industry to review and improve sound practices – 
particularly those of the UK-based Hedge Fu
M
providing better risk management practices.146 
 
Up till now, regulatory focus has been directed towards ensuring that bankruptcy relating to 
hedge funds, does not trigger further systemic crisis in other parts of the financial sector.147 
From the responses obtained from the European Commission’s Consultation Document on 
Hedge Funds, a significant percentage of these were of the opinion that adequate bank 
capitalization structures were in place to contain consequences of a hedge fund crisis.148 
Furthermore, the results not only revealed that prime brokers were equipped with risk 
management tools which would shield them from counter party risks, but that respondents 
                                                 
142  see ibid at viii 
143  S Cociuba, ‘Seeking Stability: What’s Next for Banking Regulation?’ Chart 3 
http://www.ideas.repec.org/a/fip/feddel/y2009iaprnv.4no.3.html (last visited 25 May 2009) 
144  ibid 
145 FSA Annual Report  (2004/05) 22 
The risks identified by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in relation to hedge funds can be summarised as 
 
ith 
 
 managers to dispose of assets very 
ficient reliable and comparable data is 
vailable to regulators which limits their ability to make informed decisions about risk and take proportionate 
lato ment) background 
t have the 
i ncentives to create an effective control infrastructure. See 
p://w
follows: Serious market disruption and erosion of confidence as a result of the failure or significant distress of a
large and highly exposed hedge fund or, with greater probability, a cluster of medium sized hedge funds w
significant and concentrated exposures; Liquidity disruption leading to disorderly markets as hedge funds make
increasingly illiquid investments in particular markets and instruments whilst offering their investors the ability 
to withdraw their money more quickly.  
This could result in a significant liquidity mismatch and require hedge fund
quickly, causing volatile and  potentially disorderly markets; insuf
a
regu ry action to mitigate such risk; Control issues arise as the trading (rather than manage
of many hedge fund managers, and their typical ownership structures, means that some managers do no
right sk lls or i
<htt ww.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/media/notes/bn008.shtml > 
 
146  B Gadanecz ‘Recent Initiatives by the Basel-based Committees and Groups’ pg 87 
147  See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/hedgefunds/feedback_statement_en.pdf 
148  ibid 
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stringent.149 The European Commission’s Consultation Document on Hedge Funds150 should 
contribute to a consideration of the appropriateness of existing approaches to regulation and 
upervision of the hedge funds sector.151 
. Non Bank Financial Institutions 
t 
contrast to more quantitative methods of assessments 
onstitutes additional challenges.154 
. Procyclical Nature of Risk 
ity and alleviate factors which exacerbate it, extend to three areas155 are as 
es a period of downturn and financial 
 Aimed at reducing a 
    
s
 
 
2
 
Even though banks are unique in the sense of the extent of systemic risk they generate, such 
risks could also be triggered by a non bank financial institution. This could be illustrated by 
the effects of Enron’s collapse on the financial markets. It could then be argued that the 
disclosure of risk to market participants under Pillar 3 is not on its own sufficient, and tha
there is need for greater efforts to incorporate those risks attributed to non-bank institutions.  
According to Baldwin and Cave, the first regulatory challenge faced by regulators consists in 
the identification of risks that need to be reduced – not only on the basis of priority, but also 
in a way which would be approved by the public.152 Secondly, regulators are confronted with 
the challenge of managing and regulating risks in a way which is both effective and 
acceptable.153 Furthermore, the design of institutions and techniques for managing risk, the 
choice of the appropriate regulatory technique, issues relating to whether risk management or 
regulation should be “blame oriented” and the contentious topic of reliance by risk managers 
on qualitative risk evaluations in 
c
 
II
 
Proposals which have been put forward by the Financial Stability Forum in a bid to address 
pro cyclical
follows: 156 
i) A consolidation of the regulatory capital framework : Aimed at improving the 
quality and levels of capital in the banking system during periods of economic 
boom, such that when the economy experienc
pressure, stored up capital could be utilised. 
ii) A revision of the Basel II framework for market risk:
dependency on “cyclical VAR based capital estimates”157  
                                             
149  ibid; Many respondents also thought that banks’ risk assessment systems were robust enough to address 
counter party risks – even though such responses were based on preliminary assessments. Due to the fact that 
ounter party and market risks coucredit, c ld speedily materialize, some respondents considered further 
consolidation of prime broker management of hedge fund related risk as essential in limiting the possibilities of a 
systemic impact being triggered. 
150 Whose period of consultation was between 18.12.2008 and 31.01.2009 
151 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/alternative_investments_en.htm 
152  R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford 
University Press at pages 142 and 143 
153  ibid at 143 
154 ibid at 144 
155 These are “bank capital framework”, “ bank loan loss provisions” and “leverage and valuation issues”. See 
Annex on Procyclicality ,COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT accompanying document to the 
Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Capital 
Requirements Directive on trading book, securitization issues and remuneration policies IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT, July 2009 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assesment_en.pdf> pages 45 and 46 
 
156  ibid 
157  ibid at page 46 
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iii) Bolstering risk based capital requirements with a measurement base which is 
neither risk based nor complex. This is aimed at facilitating the management of 
leverage in the banking system 
iv) The imposition of a requirement that supervisors adopt the Basel Committee’s 
d 
apital 
s pro 
en highlighted in bank risk management processes during 
e recent crises.  Areas which have been addressed include “firm- wide governance and 
sk management”, the capture of risks emanating from off-balance sheet exposures and 
 risk concentrations, the provision of incentives to 
anks in order to facilitate better management of risks and returns on a long term basis , and 
y since 
 the changes resulting from a dynamic and more complex 
nancial environment. The adoption of the Capital Requirements Directive has resulted in 
ore comprehensive capital requirements that are particularly geared towards accounting for 
“operational risk.”165 Furthermore, the rules have become more risk sensitive – hence 
plement approaches designed to select regulatory capital which 
esp  with their situation.166 
stress testing practices 
v) Monitoring the effect of Basel II and implementing relevant adjustments to ease 
“excessive cyclicality of minimum capital requirements”158 which relate to the 
“risk coverage f the capital framework”159. 
 
In response to Basel II’s shortcoming and since capital regulation contributes to the degree of 
economic downturns160, a complement of the rules on bank capital with rules on liquidity an
leverage is proposed by Cociuba as a means of addressing the inadequacy of risk based c
measures in promoting the stability of the financial system.161 
 
Furthermore, counter cyclical regulatory mechanisms have been proposed to addres
cyclical problems which have not been addressed by Basel II.162 Recent amendments to the 
Basel II framework and Pillar 2 (supervisory review process) in particular, are aimed at 
addressing weaknesses that have be
163th
ri
securitisation activities, the management of
b
“sound management practices”.164 
 
 
III. Risk Management at EU Level 
 
In view of all that has been considered in this paper, namely, increased globalisation, 
conglomeration and the impact of systemic risks across national boundaries, the need for risk 
management at European would appear almost inevitable. Basel II has come a long wa
its inception and although it has encountered its fair share of regulatory challenges, it is 
constantly evolving and adapting to
fi
m
providing for institutions to im
corr onds
                                                 
158  ibid 
159  ibid 
160  Since banks choose to reduce lending when capital is scarce 
161 ibid; also see The Run on the Rock," House of Commons Treasury Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2007–
ol. 
es of Financial Regulation: Geneva Reports 
n the World Economy 11’, Preliminary Draft 2009 at pages 29-35 
 Enhancements to the Basel II Framework’ Bank For International Settlements, July 2009 < 
//ww
FF WORKING DOCUMENT 
ompanying document to the Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
 CO
08, v 1, January 2008, pp. 14–15. 
162  See M Brunnermeier and others,‘The Fundamental Principl
o
163  See ‘
http: w.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.htm> (last visited 27 July 2009) 
 
164  ibid 
165  The risk of systems breaking down; see COMMISSION STA
acc
THE UNCIL amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, securitization issues and 
remuneration policies IMPACT ASSESSMENT, July 2009 at page 7 
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Further work is required in adopting measures aimed at improving bad incentive structures - 
l rules at EU level, which are 
imed at providing clear explicit requirements which stipulate that “remuneration policies of 
nancial institutions be subject to supervisory oversight”.167 
ation 
hich involves the dynamic linkage between societal and institutional risks, as propounded by 
icance cannot be ignored – hence the need for a form of regulation which is 
ble to manage risk more effectively and which would best suit an evolving regulatory 
nvironment. 
                                                                                                                                                      
which contribute not only to high levels of risk taking, but also to increased pro cyclicality. 
This is complicated due to the fact there is need for clear lega
a
fi
 
 
 
IV. The Potential of Meta Risk Regulation 
 
Meta risk regulation is proposed as a means of quantifying and managing risks under the risk 
society theory – risks which I would like to refer to as institutional risks. Such a proposal 
would not only address, to an extent, the concerns of Beck (in relation to matters of 
accountability), but would also be a more appropriate means of controlling more complex 
risks which have resulted from developments of science and technology. Such risks can be 
contrasted with the more “traditional and novel societal risks”. Enforced Self Regulation is 
proposed as a means of addressing such less complex and more traditional forms of risk – 
whilst providing some scope for the role of judicial governance and the involvement of courts. 
Courts are simply not adequately equipped to deal with the pace with which some financial 
instruments, such as derivatives, operate. Even though the Capital Requirements Directive 
had provided for increased pro cyclicality, it came into force after the 2007/08 Financial 
Crises had practically ended – thus making it impossible for it to have any impact on the 
Crisis. As a result, the role of courts and judicial governance in risk regulation should 
constitute a topic for purposes of future research. Furthermore, the theory of risk colonis
w
Rothstein et al, and within this context,168 would constitute a fertile ground for research. 
 
The ability of responsive regulation to address such a complex169 factor as risk, its flexibility 
and responsiveness to regulatees and its environment, among other advantages, make it a 
more desirable regulatory tool than traditional regulation or risk based regulation. Whilst 
direct monitoring by the State would be required, the involvement of third parties such as non 
government organisations would also be crucial to ensuring that a situation, whereby the State 
could be captured, is avoided. Furthermore the possibilities available in achieving the right 
“regulatory mix” make it a promising regulatory tool. Even though the contested nature of 
risk contributes to the difficulty of relying on risk as a regulatory tool, its presence and ever 
growing signif
a
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6  The Internal Rating Based Approach for example, enables institutions to decide on capital requirements 
for credit risk through an incorporation of their own “risk inputs”. See ibid 
 
16
167 ibid at page 18 
168 See H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics 
of Societal and Institutional Risk at page 107 
169 According to Baldwin and Cave, risk regulators encounter problems with the search for legitimation as a 
result of differences between the lay and experts’ perceptions of risk. For additional information on what could 
be done to improve the effect of legitimating arguments and solutions advanced to counter problems of risk 
regulation, see R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford 
University Press at pages 145 –149. For problems with defining and assessing risk, see page 138 ibid 
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